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Read Between the Lines: Considering
the Party Agreement When
Determining Arbitrability in Bilateral
Investment Treaties
Republic ofArgentina v. BG Group PLC'
I. INTRODUCTION
Considering the recent growth of bilateral and multilateral investment trea-
ties, it should be no surprise that disputes between parties to such agreements have
become an almost common occurrence. 2 Generally, many of these treaty agree-
ments contain a wide variety of dispute resolution mechanisms, including arbitra-
tion agreements, while others present more limited options to the parties.3 In Re-
public ofArgentina v. BG Group PLC, the arbitration agreement between the par-
ties came with a preconditional string attached which 'led to intense litigation.4
Despite a curious past, the BG Group decision ultimately rested on one of the
pillars of arbitration itself: party autonomy. Paradoxically, the appellate court's
decision in BG Group to overturn the district court and the arbitration tribunal
arguably strengthened the institution of arbitration rather than weakening it, as
many international arbitration proponents have opined.5 Without party autonomy,
arbitration itself might cease to exist as we know it.6
This note will discuss the impact party autonomy and limited judicial review
of arbitral awards have on the issue of arbitrability, concluding that parties should
be held to their agreement despite strict judicial review limitations. It will also
discuss the implications of BG Group for the manifest disregard of law doctrine.
Furthermore, this note will also attempt to examine the future ramifications this
decision may have on other courts and arbitration panels facing a similar issue. It
will primarily focus on the role of party autonomy in arbitration and how such
party interest analysis should and does supersede other legal issues in arbitration.
1. 665 F.3d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
2. See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1523 (2005).
3. Id. at 1540-41.
4. Id.; see generally Republic of Argentina v. BG Group PLC, 764 F. Supp. 2d 21, 24 (D.D.C.
2011), rev'd, 665 F.3d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Republic of Argentina v. BG Group PLC, 715 F. Supp.
2d 108, 113 (D.D.C. 2010), rev'd, 665 F.3d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
5. Brief for BG Group PLC as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Republic of Argentia v. BG
Group PLC, 665 F.3d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 12-138), 2012 WL 3805768 (U.S.).
6. See, e.g., J.S. McClendon and R.E. Goodman, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN
NEW YORK 3 (Brill Acad. Publishers 1986). The authors state that, "[tihe most obvious advantage [of
arbitration] is party autonomy resulting from the fact that arbitration is the creature of a contract be-
tween the parties." Id.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On December 11, 1990, the Republic of Argentina (Argentina) and the United
Kingdom signed the Bilateral Investment Treaty ("the Treaty"). 7 The Treaty be-
came effective February 19, 1993 after Argentina implemented economic refor-
mations aimed at reducing their public debt and inflation.8 In Article 8(2) of the
Treaty, the two parties agreed to an international arbitration provision to govern
investment disputes.9 The arbitration agreement could only be invoked once a
preconditioned eighteen-month waiting period had elapsed.' 0 Article 8(3) includ-
ed more specific arbitration provisions, such as utilizing UNCITRAL rules."
In early 1992,12 Argentina privatized its state-owned gas transportation and
distribution company, Gas del Estrado, and ultimately split the company into two
transportation companies and eight distribution companies.' 3  One of the new
distribution companies, MetroGAS, was granted a thirty-five year exclusive li-
cense to distribute gas in the city of Buenos Aires as well as the surrounding met-
ropolitan area. 14 BG Group PLC (BG Group), a British corporation, invested
directly in MetroGAS, and by 1998 owned a 45.11% share in the Argentine gas
distribution company.' 5
During late 2001 and early 2002, a dispute arose between Argentina and BG
Group amidst a serious downturn in Argentina's economy.16 In response to this
economic collapse, Argentina enacted several measures to mitigate the financial
7. Republic of Argentina v. BG Group PLC, 65 F.3d 1363, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
8. Id.
9. Id. Article 8(2) of the Treaty sets requirements by which an investment dispute arising out of
Article 8(l) may go to international arbitration including: "(a) if one of the Parties so requests, in any
of the following circumstances: (i) where, after a period of eighteen months has elapsed from the
moment when the dispute was submitted to the competent tribunal of the Contracting Party in whose
territory the investment was made, the said tribunal has not given its final decision; (ii) where the final
decision of the aforementioned tribunal has been made but the Parties are still in dispute; [or](b) where
the Contracting Party and the investor of the other Contracting Party have so agreed." Id. (quoting
language from Art. 8(2) of the Treaty (emphasis added)).
10. Id.
I1. Id. Article 8(3) provides "that if, after three months from written notification of the claim, the
parties to the dispute are unable to agree on one of the described arbitration procedures, then 'the
Parties to the dispute shall be bound to submit it to arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the Unit-
ed Nations Commission on International Trade Law ["UNCITRAL Rules"],' although they can modify
these rules.") Id. (quoting language from Art. 8(3)).
12. Andres Gomez-Lbo & Vivien Foster, The 1996-97 Gas Price Review in Argentina. WORLD
BANK (1999), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/11493.
13. BG Group, 665 F.3d at 1366. Argentina also instituted a 1:1 fixed parity between the Argentine
peso and the U.S. dollar that would later be subject to the enactments Argentina passed during eco-
nomic distress. Id. at 1366-67.
14. Id. at 1366. The license "provided that tariffs would be calculated in U.S. dollars and expressed
in pesos.. .[a] provision of [the] license provided that adjustments to tariffs would be made every six
months for inflation, in accordance with the ... ("PPI"). MetroGAS was entitled to review of its tariffs
every five years to ensure reasonable returns." Id.
15. Id. at 1366-67. BG Group owned a 54.67% share in Gas Argentino, S.A. (GASA), which owned
70% of MetroGAS. Id. at 1366.
16. Id. at 1367. The economic downturn in Argentina involved a "collapse of Brazilian currency, a
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damage.' 7  Most notably, Argentina adopted Decree 214/02, Article 12, also
known as the Emergency Law, on March 2, 2002.18 This measure provided for a
180-day stay, regarding compliance with injunctions and execution of final judg-
ments in lawsuits brought involving the Emergency Law's impact on the financial
system.19 Eight months after the prescribed stay had expired, BG Group filed a
notice of arbitration pursuant to Article 8(3) of the Treaty.20 Subsequently, be-
cause BG Group was unable to agree with Argentina on an alternative forum or
procedure, it submitted to arbitration governed by UNCITRAL Rules.2 1 BG
Group argued that compliance with the eighteen month waiting period prior to
commencing arbitration as prescribed in Article 8(1)22 and Article 8(2)23 of the
Treaty would require an estimated six years to resolve in Argentina state courts,
24and therefore argued that it was "senseless" to uphold the provisions. BG Group
also argued that customary international law did not require the exhaustion of
local remedies and further reasoned that Article 3 of the Treaty, known as the
"Most Favored Nation Clause," eliminated the need to first go to Argentine courts
because Argentina's treaty with the United States did not have this requirement. 25
An International Chamber of Commerce-appointed arbitral panel in Washing-
ton D.C. ruled it had jurisdiction over BG Group and Argentina's proceedings and
issued a final award on December 24, 2007.26 While the panel rejected BG
Group's argument that the dispute was arbitrable because of the delay in the Ar-
gentine courts, it concluded that the Article 8(2) provision could not, according to
Treaty interpretation, be regarded as "an absolute impediment to arbitration." 27
The panel cited Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, reasoning that because Ar-
17. Id. Argentina enacted Emergency Law 25,561 on January 6, 2002 with the intent to forbid
inflation adjustments based on foreign price indices as well as to change dollar-based tariffs into peso-
based tariffs on a scale of one to one. Argentina also adopted Resolution 308/02 and Decree 1090/02,
which involved renegotiation of public service contracts but excluded any licensee who desired any
redress by arbitration or in court. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. BG Group, 665 F.3d at 1367.
21. Id.
22. Id. Article 8(1) of the Treaty provides that "disputes between an investor under the Treaty and
the host State that 'have not been amicably settled shall be submitted, at the request of one of the
Parties to the dispute to the decision of the competent tribunal of the Contracting Party in whose terri-
tory the investment was made."' Id. at 1366.
23. Id. at 1366.
24. Id. at 1367 (citing Final Award 11142).
25. Id.; compare Marian Nash (Leich), Bilateral Investment Treaties United States--Argentina, 87
AM. J. INT'L L. 433, 433 (1993) (explaining that the U.S.-Argentina BIT, "which contains an absolute
right to international arbitration of investment disputes, removes U.S. investors from the restrictions of
the Calvo Doctrine and... [b]y providing important protections to investors and creating a more stable
and predictable legal framework for investment, the BIT helps to encourage U.S. investment" (citation
omitted)) with the UK-Argentina BIT (where the panel noted the BIT did not have a "national securi-
ty" exception similar to that of Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT). Steven Smith, et al., Interna-
tional Commercial Dispute Resolution, 43 INT'L LAW. 443, 466 (2009) (citing n.7).
26. BG Group, 665 F.3d at 1367. In this case, the parties had designated the ICC COURT as the
"appointing authority". Award 119. The tribunal claimed jurisdiction under UNCITRAL Article 2 1(1)
which states, "[t]he arbitral tribunal shall have the power to rule on objections that it has no jurisdic-
tion." BG Group, 665 F.3d at 1371 (citing UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 21, 1
1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976). See also Republic of Argentina v. BG Group PLC, 715 F.
Supp. 2d 108, 114 (D.D.C. 2010), rev'd, 665 F.3d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
27. Id. (citing Final Award 11147).
No. 1] 235
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gentina had constrained court access by emergency enactments and excluded any
28licensees from the renegotiation process, a iteral interpretation of the Treaty
would create an "absurd and unreasonable result." 29 Thus, the panel concluded
that it was not necessary to determine whether Articles 8(1) and (2) were inopera-
tive. 30
Argentina argued a "state-of-necessity defense," a common defense in inter-
national law,31 asserting that its economic collapse created exceptional circum-
stances that could not have been avoided.32 The panel rejected this argument,
finding that Argentina had violated Article 2 of the Treaty. According to the
panel, Argentina's actions in the early 1990s induced BG Group's investment, and
by disabling the regulations that initially encouraged BG Group to invest, Argen-
tina had failed to provide "fair and equitable treatment" which was required in
Article 2(2).3 Furthermore, the panel found that Argentina's violation was exac-
erbated by the fact that licensees seeking renegotiation were excluded from arbi-
tration or similar forums. 35 In the end, the panel awarded damages to BG Group
of approximately 185 million U.S. dollars.36
Following the panel's decision, Argentina filed a petition under the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 10(a) and 11,37 to vacate or modify the final
award on the grounds that the panel acted beyond its authority by ignoring the
28. See supra text accompanying notes 14 & 17. Argentina's establishment of Resolution 308/03
and Decree 1090/02 created a renegotiation process for public service contracts but excluded any
licensee who desired any redress by arbitration or in court, like BG Group.
29. BG Group, 665 F.3d at 1367-68 (citing Final Award 1 147).
30. Id. at 1368.
31. Eric David Kasenetz, Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures: The Aftermath of Argen-
tina's State ofNecessity and the Current Fight in the Icsid, 41 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 709, 719-20
(2010). Author states that the doctrine is "generally accepted in the international community as a
customary defense to state responsibilities regarding treaties." Id.
32. BG Group, 665 F.3d at 1368 (citing Final Award 1| 410).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1368. Article 2(2) of the Treaty provides that "[i]nvestments of investors of each Contract-
ing Party shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment.... [n]either Contracting Party shall
in any way impair by unreasonable ... measures the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or
disposal of investments in its territory.... [e]ach Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it may
have entered into with regard to investments of investors of the other Contracting Party." Id. at n.3
(emphasis added).
35. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 14 & 28.
36. Id. The panel calculated this figure by comparing BG Group's share value in 1998, three and
half years before enactment, and 2002, shortly after enactment. Id. Thus, the panel calculated the total
investment and figured the loss incurred by way of Argentina's Emergency Law. Id.
37. Id. Section 10(a) of the FAA provides that an arbitration award may be vacated, "(1) where the
award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)
(2006). Section 11 provides that an arbitration award may be vacated or corrected by a court order,
"[w]here there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the
description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award; [w]here the arbitrators have
awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the deci-
sion upon the matter submitted; [w]here the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the
merits of the controversy." 9 U.S.C. § 11 (2006).
236 [Vol. 2013
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terms of the parties' agreement, primarily Articles 8(1) and (2).38 BG Group filed
a cross-motion and sought recognition and enforcement of the final award ren-
dered by the panel.39 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied
Argentina's petition and granted enforcement of the panel award.40
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, reversed
the district court's enforcement of the panel's final award.41 The appellate court
held that because the Treaty explicitly provided that a precondition to arbitration
of BG Group's investment claim was that the claim initially needed to be submit-
ted in Argentine state court,42 and because the Treaty failed to address who decid-
ed the issue of arbitrability when that precondition was not complied with, the
question of arbitrability was an independent question of law for the Argentine
court to decide.43 The court also held that the district court improperly determined
that Argentina had conceded the arbitrability issue and therefore reversed the dis-
trict court's ruling while also vacating the award."
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Bilateral investment treaties ("BITs"), like the one at issue in BG Group, are
negotiated agreements between two countries ("sovereigns") with the primary
purpose of attracting foreign investment by granting investors extensive invest-
ment rights.45 The resulting foreign investment these agreements provide have
proved to be a valuable tool for economic development and global prosperity for
participants by allowing developing nations to use foreign investor funds for the
development of local industries and infrastructure. 46 In return, investors generally
receive positive financial returns and also gain a foothold in these emerging mar-
kets.47
BITs often present flexible dispute resolution options, such as arbitration or
the sovereigns' own national courts. 48 When disagreements stem from these trea-
ties and resolution is needed, investors tend to prefer arbitration to litigation due to
their fear of potential bias that may exist in a sovereign's national court system.49
This fear is evidenced by the fact that the number of arbitrations of BIT disputes
exploded in the early 2000s.o
38. Id. at 1365.
39. Id. at 1368-69.
40. Id. at 1369.
41. Id. at 1373.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 9 & 11.
43. BG Group, 665 F.3d at 1371.
44. Id. at 1370.
45. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1521, 1522-23 (2005).
46. Id. at 1524.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1541.
49. Id. at 1542. See generally Mark Friedman & Gaetan Verhoosel, Arbitrating over BIT Claims,
NATL L.J., Sept. 15, 2003, at 15 n.78 (describing BIT claims and suggesting that investors often view
BIT arbitration as more fair than foreign courts).
50. Franck, supra note 45 at 1521.
No. 1] 237
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For parties looking for a neutral site to arbitrate, the United States has become
a popular seat for this brand of international arbitration over the last thirty years.5 1
The U.S. Supreme Court has extended its strong federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion to international commercial disputes. 52 Arbitrating international commercial
disputes allows parties to remove themselves from a potentially unfavorable fo-
rum in national courts, just as BG Group attempted to do. 5 3
A. An Overview ofArbitral Governance
The New York Convention is an international treaty that governs internation-
al arbitration and fosters recognition and enforcement of non-domestic arbitral
awards. 54 In the United States, the FAA governs arbitrational agreements-both
domestic and international.5 5  The FAA was signed into law in 1925 and was
amended in 1970 to incorporate the New York Convention.5 6 In BG Group, the
panel's award fell within the non-domestic provision of the New York Conven-
tion, which granted the district court jurisdiction to hear Argentina's claim to set
aside the panel's award.
Under the FAA, only a few limited grounds exist upon which a court may va-
cate or overturn an arbitration panel's award. Section 9 of the FAA provides
that a court is required to confirm an award unless it is vacated, modified, or cor-
rected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11. 59 Section 10 discusses the grounds for
vacating an award while section 11 establishes the grounds where an award may
be corrected or modified.o
As for governance of arbitration in other countries, the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration ("UNCITRAL Model Law") is a very important tool in
the field of international commercial arbitration.61 Many countries have adopted
UNCITRAL guidelines when faced with the task of crafting legislation applicable
51. See GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 132 (2009). The United States
was the seat to the present arbitration tribunal and had jurisdiction for judicial review, so U.S arbitra-
tion law (FAA) will be the focus of this Legal Background.
52. Susan L. Karamanian, The Road to the Tribunal and Beyond: International Commercial Arbitra-
tion and United States Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 17 (2002). The Supreme Court has said
that the United States has an "emphatic federal policy in favor or arbitral dispute resolution" as well as
a "strong belief in the efficacy of arbitral procedures for the resolution of international commercial
disputes..." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985).
53. Id.
54. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,
21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
55. See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2006); see also Born, supra note 51, at 132.
56. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2006) (incorporating the New York Convention).
57. See Republic of Argentina v. BG Group PLC, 665 F.3d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The court found
that "...the Award plainly falls within the "non-domestic" provision of Article 1(1) of the New York
Convention and, consequently, this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain this matter un-
der 9 U.S.C. § 203." Id.
58. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 (2006).
59. Id.
60. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (2006); see also supra text accompanying note 37.
61. BORN, supra note 51, at 115.
238 [Vol. 2013
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to international trade.62 The UNCITRAL Model Law has been revised as recently
as 2006 to account for recent trends in international arbitration.6 3
Aside from national legislation, there are also rules that govern the procedural
framework of international arbitrations and there are two distinct styles of interna-
tional arbitration that dictate would rules will be used, "institutional" and "ad
hoc."" There are numerous arbitration institutional organizations65 that govern
arbitration tribunals in a style known as institutional arbitration. 66 Ad hoc arbitra-
tion is not conducted under the supervision of an institutional organization; rather,
the parties simply agree to arbitrate without such formal procedures. Institution-
al and ad hoc arbitration both have their advantages and disadvantages.6 1 Institu-
tional arbitration is administered by a staff of employees under a set procedural
framework, which provides for a reliable and prompt process, but it is more ex-
pensive. 69 Ad hoc arbitration is more flexible and less expensive, but it is less
structured and can be less predictable.70
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were designed for, and are a prominent
set of rules commonly used in, an ad hoc styled arbitration.7 1 In certain cases, as
illustrated by BG Group, the parties will request an organizational institution to
select the arbitrators for the proceeding even if the parties are utilizing an ad hoc
style.72 Thus, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules can be used in conjunction with
an institutional organization such as the ICC in BG Group.73 The ICC is an insti-
tutional organization with its own rules for governing arbitrations, but the ICC
rules are broadly similar to the UNCITRAL Rules as they too provide a procedur-
al framework for arbitral proceedings. 74 One of the ICC's primary functions is to
appoint arbitrators and resolve challenges to the appointment of arbitrators.7 5 The
ICC is the institution of preference for many commercial users despite receiving
criticism by some that claim the ICC rules are expensive and cumbersome.76
62. Id. at 119-20. The author notes that some 50 jurisdictions have adopted legislation based off of
the Model Law as of 2008. Id. at 119.
63. Id. at 118-19. It is important to note that Article 21(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 21, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976), provides that "[t]he arbitral
tribunal shall have the power to rule on objections that it has no jurisdiction" to hear the arbitration.
BG Group, 665 F.3d at 1368 n.3.
64. Id. at 148.
65. Id. at 148-49. The author notes that popular arbitration institutions include the ICC, the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association ("AAA") and its International Centre for Dispute Resolution ("ICDR"),
and the London Court of International Arbitration ("LCIA"). Id. at 148.
66. BORN, supra note 51, at 148.
67. Id. at 149.
68. Id. at 150.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 150-51.
71. Id. at 151-52.
72. BORN, supra note 51, at 150.
73. See generally BG Group, 665 F.3d at 1363.
74. BORN, supra note 51, at 156.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 157.
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B. Judicial Review, Manifest Disregard of the Law,
and Party Agreement
Because the panel was seated in the United States and the FAA governed the
decisions of the district and appellate courts, U.S. jurisprudence is an important
aspect when discussing BG Group. Two recent Supreme Court decisions have
markedly shaped the way courts treat arbitration in the United States. These cases
involved two distinct issues that came to a head in BG Group: the limitations on
courts in reviewing arbitration awards and the need to respect the parties' right to
contract.77
In Hall Street Associates, LLC. v. Mattel, Inc., the Supreme Court was faced
with the issue of expanded judicial review of an arbitration award based on the
parties' agreement.7 8 In holding that sections 10 and 11 in the FAA are the exclu-
sive grounds for vacating, modifying or correcting an arbitration award, Hall
Street made a very important distinction by limiting judicial review to the FAA's
enumerated grounds.79 Thus, the parties were not allowed to expand judicial re-
view through contract.80 The Court explained that instead of fighting the statute's
text, it was simply logical to read and interpret the FAA on its face, which re-
stricted judicial review to specific grounds.8 According to the Court, such limited
review is required to maintain arbitration's goal of speedy dispute resolution. 82
Hall Street greatly constrained a court's role in reviewing arbitration awards by
setting clear precedent that the enumerated grounds in the FAA are the sole means
to challenge the outcome of an arbitration proceeding. 83
Since Hall Street, lower courts have struggled to distinguish what grounds
have survived the Supreme Court's test of what constitutes a justifiable reason to
overturn or vacate an arbitration award.84 Hall Street is significant because, under
the FAA, an arbitrator's failure to follow the law is not one of the specifically
85enumerated grounds for vacating an award. However, most jurisdictions have
long recognized a non-statutory doctrine, "manifest disregard of the law," as suf-
ficient grounds for vacating an arbitrator's award. 86 The doctrine is used as cause
for vacatur when, upon review, a judge determines that the arbitrator knew the law
77. See Hall St. Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Ani-
malFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
78. Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 576-77.
79. Id. at 577. The Court recognized that the "question here is whether statutory grounds for prompt
vacatur and modification may be supplemented by contract. We hold that the statutory grounds are
exclusive." Id. at 578 (emphasis added). See also supra text accompanying note 37.
80. Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 577-78.
81. Id. at 577. The Court reasoned that, "[i]nstead of fighting the text, it makes more sense to see § §
9-11 as the substance of a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to
maintain arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway." Id.
82. Id.
83. See generally Hall St. Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc, 552 U.S. 576 (2008)..
84. Annie Chen, The Doctrine of Manifest Disregard of the Law After Hall Street: Implications for
Judicial Review of International Arbitrations in U.S. Courts, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1872, 1875
(2009).
85. Timothy M. O'Shea, Arbitration's Appeal: The Grounds Have Narrowed, 66 BENCH & B.
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but disregarded it.8 7 The holding in Hall Street complicated the doctrine's viabil-
ity to vacate an arbitration award and lower courts are reaching different conclu-
sions on the doctrine's status.8 8
The manifest disregard of law doctrine again reached the Supreme Court two
years after Hall Street was decided in Stolt-Nielsen v. Anirnalfeeds International
Corp.89 The Stolt-Nielsen Court had to determine whether a claim was arbitrable
when the parties' agreement was silent on the matter.90 The arbitral tribunal had
concluded that class arbitration was appropriate.9' The district court reversed the
tribunal's award due to the manifest disregard of the law doctrine, but the Second
Circuit reversed in favor of the tribunal.92
The Supreme Court granted certiorari but failed to make a determination on
whether the "manifest disregard of the law" issue survived Hall Street's strict
limitation on judicial review as the district court had determined. 93 Instead, the
Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding that requiring parties to submit to class
arbitration when it was not discussed in their agreement would be contrary to the
FAA. 94 The Court primarily focused on party consent and how courts and arbitra-
tors must give deference to the parties' contract.95 Stolt-Nielsen is significant for
its emphasis on the intent of the parties in making the determination of arbitrabil-
ity and the Court's conclusion that a party cannot be forced to arbitrate when it
had not agreed to do so. 96
C. The Arbitrability Issue in the United States
Generally, the issue of arbitrability involves determining whether parties have
agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration. 97 However, the question of arbitrability
can be seen as two-fold: first, "who should decide arbitrability" and second,
"whether a particular merits-related dispute is arbitrable because it is within the
scope of a valid arbitration agreement." 98 Determining arbitrability can be a com-
plex task, and some courts have likened it to a "box within a box . . . [arbitrability
is] the authority as to the authority to make a decision." 99 Because it is considered
87. Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The "Manifest Disregard of the Law"
Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137, 165 (2011).
88. O'Shea, supra note 85, at 31; see also Chen, supra note 84, at 1876, 1891.
89. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1766 (2010).
90. Id at 1764.
91. Id. at 1761.
92. Id. at 1761-62.
93. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768, n.3.
94. Id. at 1762.
95. Id. (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
479 (1989)). The Court stated that arbitration is a "matter of consent, not coercion" and in construing
an arbitration agreement, courts and arbitrators must "give effect to the [parties'] contractual rights and
expectations.") Id; see also infra note 117.
96. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776..
97. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 573 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v.
Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S 643,649 (1986)).
98. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944-45 (1995).
99. Exparte Perry v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc., 744 So. 2d 859, 866 n.5 (Ala. 1999).
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a threshold issue, arbitrability must be decided before a court or tribunal can reach
the merits. 00
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed several cases involving arbitrability
over the years.' 0' In First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, the Court held that
the contracting parties' intent controlled whether the question of arbitrability
would be posed to a court or an arbitrator.' 02 In First Options, because the parties
did not clearly agree to submit the question of arbitrability to arbitration, the Su-
preme Court affirmed the lower court's finding that the arbitrability of the dispute
was subject to independent review by the courts. 0 3 First Options is significant
because the Court rejected the idea of requiring a party to raise the arbitrability
issue in litigation prior to arbitration.'" In so holding, the Court essentially al-
lowed a party to challenge an arbitral award by raising the arbitrability issue after
the fact and to argue that the parties never submitted to arbitration in the first
place. 05
The Supreme Court reached a different conclusion in John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
v. Livingston.106 In John Wiley, the Court distinguished between substantive and
procedural questions of arbitrability and said that courts should determine substan-
tive questions and arbitrators should determine procedural questions of arbitrabil-
ity. o0 Therefore, the Court concluded that the dispute was to be decided by an
arbitrator because the question was procedural in nature.'08 Ultimately, the Court
upheld the arbitration clause, focusing its reasoning on the need for speedy resolu-
tion and a strong policy preference for arbitration in the context of labor dis-
putes. 109
In AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers ofAm., the Supreme
Court manifested the presumption that courts would decide the question of arbi-
trability unless "the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.""10 More
recently, in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the Court reinforced its deci-
sion from AT&T and held that courts determine arbitrability when the parties are
not clear in their agreement on whether arbitrators or a court should decide the
issue."' In Howsam, the Court attempted to further refine the "who" question of
arbitrability by outlining limited circumstances in which parties should expect a
100. See Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83-84. The Court acknowledged that an arbitrability determination
must occur before the merits in saying, "...its answer will determine whether the underlying controver-
sy will proceed to arbitration [or litigation] on the merits." Id.
101. See, e.g., Id.; AT&T, 475 U.S. at 649; First Options, 514 U.S. at 938; John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v.
Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 543 (1964).
102. See generally First Options, 514 U.S. 938.
103. Id. at 947.
104. Id. at 946.
105. See generally, Claudia D. Hartleben, Argentina v. BG Group and the Question of Arbitrability,
2012 A.B.A. SEC. INT. LIT. SEC. 1-2.
106. John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. at 559 (1964).
107. Id. at 557-58.
108. Id. (reasoning that, "procedural questions.. should be left for the arbitrator.").
109. Id. at 558. The court recognized that, "such delay may entirely eliminate the prospect of a
speedy arbitrated settlement of the dispute, to the disadvantage of the parties... and contrary to the
aims of national labor policy." Id.
I 10. AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).
111. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002).
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court to decide this "gateway matter."" 2 These circumstances include whether the
parties are bound to a particular arbitration agreement."13
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Republic of Argentina v. BG Group PLC, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and vacated the district court's
decision to enforce an ICC-appointed panel's award that favored BG Group.114
The court acknowledged that judicial review in such arbitral circumstances is
narrow, but it disagreed with the panel's award because of the district court's reli-
ance on outside legal sources and its failure to consider the agreement of the con-
tracting parties.' 1 The court noted the parties' contract expressly established a
preconditional waiting period"'6 that needed to be satisfied before proceeding to
arbitration."' The court also acknowledged the panel's finding that BG Group
had standing on the merits due to its status as an investor and an investment that
lost value as a direct result of Argentina's Emergency Law." 8
According to the BG Group court, the gateway issue on appeal was the ques-
tion of arbitrability,' '9 specifically whether a court or an arbitrator should deter-
mine what the parties intended.120 An additional issue was whether BG Group
rightfully sought arbitration instead of first seeking recourse in Argentine state
court pursuant to Article 8(1) of the Treaty.121
The court referenced the Supreme Court's propensity for holding that the par-
ties' intent controls the issue of whether a court or an arbitrator is to decide ques-
tions of arbitrability.122 The court reasoned that this logic agrees with the basic
notion that arbitration is not simply meant to resolve disputes in the quickest way
possible, but primarily it is meant to honor the parties' agreement.12 3 In turn, the
court noted that whoever interprets the arbitration clause-be it is a court or an
arbitrator-must give effect to the parties' interests and expectations.124 The court
also cited Supreme Court precedent concerning how courts will decide arbitrabil-
112. Id. at 83-84. The Court said that the presumption of courts deciding arbitrability protects the
parties and "...avoids the risk of forcing parties to arbitrate a matter that they may well not have agreed
to arbitrate... [t]hus, a gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration
clause raises a 'question of arbitrability' for a court to decide." Id.
113. Id.
114. Republic of Arg. V. BG Group PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
115. Id. at 1365-66.
116. Id. at 1366; see also supra text accompanying note 9.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1368; see also supra text accompanying notes 26-36 for further discussion on the panel's
reasoning and decision.
119. Id. at 1369.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1371-72.
122. Id. at 1369. See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). The
court emphasized that "[c]ourts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability
unless there is 'clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]' evidence that they did so.") Id. (quoting AT & T Techs.,
Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)) (alterations in original).
123. BG Group, 665 F.3d at at 1369 (citing First Options 514 U.S. at 947).
124. Id. (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int' Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773-74 (2010)).
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ityl25 and stated that when parties do not expressly agree to send the arbitrability
question to an arbitrator, the question should go to a court.126 Furthermore, the
court found that the arbitrability question should be sent to arbitrators only if the
parties explicitly manifest that it is their intent to do so.1 27
The appellate court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that Argen-
tina had conceded the issue of arbitrability when Argentina's counsel acknowl-
edged the panel's jurisdiction in its motions.128 It reasoned that Argentina's con-
cession was directed solely to the context in which the Treaty's arbitration provi-
sion was properly triggered, such as after the waiting period had elapsed, and only
then would the arbitrator decide any question of arbitrability.129 Therefore, the
court found that Argentina only conceded that arbitrability would be determined
by an arbitrator after Articles 8(1) and (2) of the Treaty were satisfied.130 Thus,
the court held that the district court erred in finding that Argentina had acceded
jurisdictional power to the arbitrators, because such a finding would be contrary to
the parties' agreement.13 1 The court reemphasized this holding by stating that
Article 8(3)132 of the Treaty could only be operative after the injured party had
sought recourse in Argentine courts as prescribed by Articles 8(1) and (2). 133
The court acknowledged that the Treaty did not speak directly to what would
occur when a party did not meet the precondition.134 The court compared the
parties' investment dispute to a hypothetical one between the countries them-
selves, in which case the Treaty's language in Article 9 demanded arbitration.135
The court suggested that the absence of such direct language in Article 8, like that
of the kind used in Article 9, was intentional and demonstrated that Argentina and
125. Id. (citing Howsam v. Dean Witter, which stated that courts will decide the question of arbitrabil-
ity, "in the kind of narrow circumstances where the contracting parties would likely have expected a
court to have decided the gateway matter, where they are not likely to have thought that they had
agreed that an arbitrator would do so, and, consequently, where reference of the gateway dispute to the
court avoids the risk of forcing parties to arbitrate a matter that they may well not have agreed to
arbitrate." Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83-84 (2002)).
126. Id. at 1369-70 (citing First Options, 514 U.S. at 943, explaining that where "the parties
did not agree to submit the arbitrability question itself to arbitration, then the district court should
decide that question ... independently." Id.
127. Id. at 1370.
128. Id.
129. Id. The court referenced the objection Argentina's counsel's made in its brief, "[t]he con-
text... indicate[s] that Argentina was conceding an altogether different point: once the Treaty's arbitra-
tion provision was properly triggered, after eighteen months' recourse to an Argentine court, any ques-
tion of arbitrability then would be decided by the arbitrator. See Tr., Sept. 28, 2010, at 5. Indeed, in the
sentence immediately following the one cited by the district court, Argentina's counsel stated: 'Howev-
er, we also understand that this Court has the right to and the duty to under the New York Convention
to assess whether ... Argentina's consent to arbitration [was] respected.' Id. at 4. The transcript indi-
cates this statement qualifies the previous sentence about arbitrability, rather than presents a new
argument, because counsel next stated that the consent was 'also' relevant to 'whether the award is
contrary or not to U.S. [public] policy,' Id, a separate argument under the New York Convention." Id.
130. BG Group, 665 F.3d at 1370.
131. Id. at 1370-72.
132. See supra text accompanying note 11.
133. BG Group, 665 F.3d at 1371.
134. Id.
135. Id. "By comparison, the Treaty states in Article 9(2) that should a dispute arise between the
contracting parties themselves, the United Kingdom and Argentina, and it is not resolved through
diplomatic channels, the dispute will go directly to arbitration. Article 9(5) provides that '[t]he [arbi-
tral] tribunal shall determine its own procedure'." Id.
244 [Vol. 2013
12
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2013, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2013/iss1/12
Read Between the Lines
BG Group were aware of the means to give an arbitrator authority to determine
arbitrability.'36
The court hypothesized that the parties likely never thought to specify that "a
court" determine whether Articles 8(1) and (2) be respected because the language
itself instructed bringing action in "court" first. 137 It also reasoned there was no
"clear and unmistakable" evidence demonstrating that the parties intended for the
arbitrators to determine the question of arbitrability.13 8 The court held that the
arbitrability question was an independent question of law for the Argentine state
court to decide.139 The court explained that the district court had erred when it
determined as a matter of law that the parties intended for an arbitrator to decide
arbitrability where BG Group had failed to satisfy the waiting period as prescribed
in the Treaty.140
The court distinguished this case from previous Supreme Court cases reach-
ing the opposite result.141 In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, the Supreme
Court was concerned with delay due to judicial proceedings before arbitration;
however, the BG Group court reasoned that while public policy strongly favored
the arbitration of labor disputes to achieve a speedy resolution, the justification
was absent in the context of international investment disputes.142 The court went
on to explain that the two cases were different in that the instant dispute involved
two sovereigns and also because the Treaty itself explicitly mandated court pro-
ceedings before commencing arbitration.143 Furthermore, the court noted that the
issue of arbitrability itself could be distinguished from the situation in John Wiley
because the parties in BG Group agreed to resolution in court prior to moving to
arbitration.'" Additionally, the court reasoned that strong public policy favoring
federal arbitration was misplaced in this context because the explicit language in
the agreement represented the parties' interest, which overrode such public policy
concerns. 145
The court concluded by again noting that BG Group was required to initiate a
lawsuit in Argentina, despite the current economic conditions, and had to satisfy
the waiting period before commencing an arbitration action pursuant to Article
8(1) of the Treaty.146 Ultimately, the court in BG Group reversed the district court
and vacated the panel's final award because they asserted that there was "only one
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. See generally AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649; First Options, 514 U.S. at 944 (where the
Supreme Court creates and reinforces the presumption that if parties do not "clear[ly] and unmistak-
abl[y]" demonstrate that an arbitrator will determine arbitrability in the agreement, then a court will
determine arbitrability). See also supra text accompanying notes 101-105; 110-113.
139. BG Group, 665 F.3d at 1371.
140. Id. at 1371-72.
141. Id. at 1372; John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
142. BG Group, 665 F.3d at 1372. The court discussed the collective bargaining process in the John
Wiley context and stressed the importance of speedy resolution "to avoid industrial strife that had
historically led to labor strikes." Id.
143. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 9.
144. BG Group, 665 F.3d at 1373.
145. Id. The court reasoned that "a court cannot lose sight of the principle that led to a policy in favor
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possible outcome" on the arbitrability question before them:147 that it was an inde-
pendent question of law for the court to decide. 148
V. COMMENT
The tension evident in BG Group between limited judicial review and party
autonomy is illustrated by the question of arbitrability.149 This underlying friction
coupled with complex international arbitration regimes, national statutes, and
arbitration institutions and rules, makes for a ripe and important decision.
A foundational principle of international commercial arbitration and the FAA
is party consent,' 50 as demonstrated by the fact that parties are considered to be
"the architects of their own arbitration process."1 5 ' The policy established by the
FAA is intended to ensure that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced ac-
cording to their terms.152 It is also significant to note that the FAA does not com-
pel arbitration against the will of the parties but only confers the right to obtain an
order directing arbitration to proceed in the manner provided for in the parties'
agreement. 1 The court in BG Group was required to apply the FAA in determin-
ing whether to vacate the panel's award. 15 4 Thus, the court was correct to adhere
to the parties' agreement and recognize that arbitration should not have com-
menced.
Party autonomy clearly prevailed in BG Group, as it should have, for it is one
of arbitration's defining characteristics.1 5 5 Without the privilege of party autono-
my, BG Group would not even have had the opportunity to arbitrate. In adhering
to the parties' agreement and the principles established by the FAA, BG Group
strengthened the institution of arbitration by reinforcing the will of the parties.
A. The BG Group Decision
In BG Group, the agreement at issue was a Bilateral Investment Treaty
("BIT") written and agreed upon by two sovereigns, Argentina and the United
Kingdom.'56 In that agreement, there existed an explicit provision that mandated
a waiting period before commencing arbitration. 5 7 In the very next Article of the
BIT, a provision authorized direct recourse to arbitration upon a dispute between
the two sovereigns, as opposed to a dispute arising out of an investor relationship
147. Id. (citing Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1770 (2010)).
148. BG Group, 665 F.3d at 1371.
149. See generally BG Group, 665 F.3d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
150. BORN, supra note 51, at 90. Author states that international commercial arbitration is "funda-
mentally consensual" and there can be no arbitration unless the parties agreed to it. Id.
151. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151 (1968).
152. Cindy G. Buys, The Arbitrators' Duty to Respect the Parties' Choice of Law in Commercial
Arbitration, 79 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 59, 70 (2005); see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2006).
153. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006) (emphasis added).
154. See generally BG Group, 665 F.3d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
155. Buys, supra note 152, at 59.
156. See generally BG Group, 665 F.3d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 9-11.
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like BG Group.'58 Thus, the appellate court was correct in finding that the parties
were well aware of how to grant an arbitrator jurisdiction directly if they so de-
sired.159 This fact also illustrates a key assumption made by the BG Group court:
that the two parties had intentionally left out any provision signaling direct arbitra-
tion in the event of an investment dispute.'60
No ambiguity was present in these provisions or in the BIT in general. Pre-
sumably, BG Group was fully aware of what they were agreeing to prior to their
investment. Therefore, a fair question to ask in this situation is why did BG
Group agree to invest if it did not appreciate the terms of the agreement? Like
most foreign investors, BG Group made its investment in an effort to make a fi-
nancial return. However, BG Group differs from other cases in the sense that
the Argentina-United Kingdom BIT protected the sovereign from a capricious
tribunal award whereas generally BITs are intended to protect a foreign investor
from hostile state courts.162 Even so, a different decision could not be justified
simply because the positions of the parties have reversed away from the norm.
B. How BG Group Settles with Hall Street
BG Group skirted the strict judicial review limitations set forth in Hall
Streetl63 by acknowledging arbitrability as a gateway issue.'" Judging from the
BG Group court's vacatur of the panel's award, the strict judicial review limita-
tions set forth in Hall Street do not insulate arbitration panels from erroneously
granting themselves jurisdiction. BG Group utilized Stolt-Niesen's textualist ap-
proach and simply interpreted the agreement on its face. Thus, the BG Group
court had no trouble with vacating the panel's award within the narrow limitations
set forth in Hall Street.165
However, discerning exactly what grounds BG Group based its vacatur on
may prove more difficult. The BG Group decision could lend itself to criticism
due to the fact that the BG Group court never directly specified on what basis it
was vacating the award, but simply concluded in saying, "we vacate the Final
Award." 66 Whether this determination was made pursuant to Section 10(a)(4) or
Section 11 of the FAA as Argentina argued, or the dubious manifest disregard of
law doctrine, remains unclear.
Yet one can infer that the BG Group court intended to use the manifest disre-
gard of law doctrine based on its earlier statement that, "the arbitral panel ren-
158. BG Group, 665 F.3d at 1371 (citing Argentina-UK Treaty). Art. 9 section 2 of the BIT clearly
states that a disagreement between Argentina and the United Kingdom "shall... be submitted to an
arbitral tribunal" and further evidenced in section 5 with., "[t]he tribunal shall determine its own pro-




161. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1524 (2005).
162. Id. at 1529-30.
163. BG Group, 665 F.3d at 1365.
164. Id. at 1369.
165. Id. at 1365. Conceding that the scope ofjudicial review is very narrow, the court said the panel
ignored the terms of the BIT and thus vacated the award. Id. at 1365-66.
166. Id. at 1373.
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dered a decision wholly based on outside legal sources ... without regard to the . .
. parties' agreement . .. [a]ccordingly . .. we vacate the Final Award."16 7 If this
inference holds true, the BG Group may very well have resurrected the manifest
disregard of law doctrine in the D.C. Circuit and validated its use as a means to
vacate arbitral awards.
Other circuits have struggled in determining whether manifest disregard of
law is a viable option for vacating arbitration awards, and the circuits remain di-
vided. With such confusion, it would have been preferable if the United States
Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen had made a determination as to the doctrine, but it
sadly failed to do so and left the door open.' 6 9 The only certainty concerning the
doctrine is that it remains unsettled. In that regard, BG Group only adds to this
confusion by potentially opening the door for the doctrine's use in the D.C. Cir-
cuit.
C. BG Group's Place into Arbitrability Jurisprudence
The result in BG Group is ultimately consistent with similar situations involv-
ing this type of complex jurisprudence regarding the issue of arbitrability by pre-
serving the intent of the parties.170 The decision falls in line with AT&T'7 ' and
other Supreme Court cases that focused on the parties' agreement.172 In doing so,
the BG Group court utilized the foundational principles most recently seen in
Stolt-Nielsen and Howsam that also adhered to the idea of honoring the parties'
agreement. 73
As the BG Group court pointed out, a decision in accordance with John
Wiley's speedy resolution rationale was not sensible here.174 It is obvious that
John Wiley cannot control in BG Group because of the major differences between
the two contexts. John Wiley called for arbitration due to a policy rationale that
fostered a speedy resolution needed in labor disputes, which may not necessarily
be present in the international arbitration context. 7 Thus, the court in BG Group
was correct in following the likes of AT&T and Howsam, rather than that of John
Wiley, due to the differing needs of parties in the labor context versus that of the
international investment context.
D. Possible Future Ramifications of BG Group
Going forward, BG Group will likely prove to be significant in a particular
set of cases in United States jurisprudence concerning the issues of arbitrability
167. Id. at 1366.
168. LeRoy, supra note 87, at 137. The author states that, "...the Court's muddled analysis in Hall
Street as to "manifest disregard" has split federal circuits." Id.
169. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at n.3. The Court explained that they did not make a determination on
whether manifest disregard of the law remained a viable basis of vacatur in saying, "[w]e do not decide
whether " 'manifest disregard' " survives our decision in Hall Street..." Id.
170. See supra note 101.
171. See supra text accompanying note I10.
172. See supra notes 101-105.
173. BG Group, 665 F.3d at 1369.
174. Id. at 1373.
175. Id. at 1372-73.
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and enforcement of arbitral awards.' 7 6 The decision in BG Group may provide
instruction to investors and sovereigns alike to read and appreciate the terms of a
BIT-or any agreement for that matter-before signing on the dotted line.17 7 BG
Group demonstrates that courts will respect the importance of party autonomy in
arbitration by enforcing the agreement the parties bargained for. The decision
also potentially leaves the door open in the D.C. Circuit for the use of the "mani-
fest disregard of the law" as grounds to vacate arbitration awards. However, the
court could be subject to criticism because the decision was unclear as to what
grounds were used to vacate the award.
As a nation, Argentina suffered a tremendous economic collapse which re-
sulted in countless lawsuits being filed against the country over the past decade.17 8
Judging from previous decisions and awards against Argentina,17 9 it may very
well lose on the merits; however, Argentina deserves what they bargained for,
namely an eighteen-month waiting period prior to arbitration commencement. BG
Group failed to comply with the straightforward provisions of the Treaty and in
the end; the court in BG Group rightly vacated the panel's award.
VI. CONCLUSION
The result in BG Group should not be a surprising one. BG Group reaffirms
the longstanding principle of party autonomy championed by the FAA as well as
the strong presumption that courts determine the question of arbitrability unless
the parties' agreement explicitly says otherwise. The agreement in dispute had an
express precondition prior to commencing arbitration. The BG Group court rec-
ognized this and rightly adhered to the will of the parties by holding that arbitra-
tion should not have commenced at all. However, the court in BG Group missed
an opportunity and failed to make a determination on the doctrine of manifest
disregard. The doctrine will likely remain muddled until the Supreme Court
makes a clear distinction. Whether other post-BG Group courts will review tribu-
nal awards as BG Group did with the parties' intent in mind should be more cer-
tain. In the future, parties will not have to worry about arbitrary tribunal awards
or strict limitations on court review as long as they remember that they hold the
176. Hartleben, supra note 105, at 5-6.
177. See e.g., ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958:
TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION (1981). As one scholar noted, the moral is that
parties should be very careful in drafting the arbitral clause. Id.
178. James L. Loftis & Adrianne L. Goins, International Law, 69 TEX. B.J. 45, 46 (2006). The au-
thors noted that in 2004, there were 35 cases pending against Argentina at the World Bank's Interna-
tional Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), a majority were based on the
measures the Argentine government introduced to address the same economic crisis seen in BG Group.
Id.
179. See generally, Eric Kazenate, Desperate Times Call For Desperate Measures: The Aftermath of
Argentina's State of Necessity And The Current Fight In The ICSID, 41 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
709. As of 2010, Argentina has been liable to damages of $665 million (or approximately 1.4 percent
of Argentina's reserve assets...resulting from the crisis). See CMS Award, supra note 8, at 468
($133.2 million); Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/09,
Award, at 320 (Sept. 5, 2008).($2.8 million); Enron Award, supra note 8, at 450 ($106.2 million);
LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Award, at I15 (July 25, 2007)
($57.4 million); Sempra Award, at 482 ($128.3 million); Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/08, Award (February 6, 2007) ($237.82 million) (quoting n.8).
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